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As a basic and crucial security requirement in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), authenti-
cation is generally used to prevent various communication attacks such as Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack. A novel broadcast authentication framework is proposed in this paper, where an
Identity-Based Signature schemes by using the Extended Chaotic Maps (ECM-IBS) is designed
to authenticate all broadcast messages and specifically, a chaos-based hash function is used for
message authentication in the WSNs. It is implemented using a WSN hardware device of CC2530
and its performance is analyzed under various methods. Performance analysis and experimental
results show that the proposed ECM-IBS scheme has a quick signature generation speed, low
energy consumption and short verification delay, and can be applied to WSN applications.
Keywords: Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), chaos, broadcast authentication, hash function.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), consisting of plenty number of low-cost micro sensor nodes [Akyildiz
et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2018], are often deployed in unattended fields, i.e., only the legitimate users could
access the network and get the data. As the WSNs have limited hardware resources, power supply capacity,
communication bandwidth and other characteristics, the broadcast authentication becomes a basic security
services in a resource-constrained environment before accessing data from the sensor nodes. In general, the
identity authentication is based on three parameters: what you know (password based), what you possess
(smart cards), and what you are (biometrics) [Cao et al., 2016]. For the WSNs, the authentication is mostly
based upon the first one (i.e., what you know). Besides, the password-based scheme must be closely related
to the secret keys and any other cryptographic material that is usually used by identities to prove their
uniqueness. Then the generation and distribution of the secret keys are the most important factors for all
security services. Thus it should be considered for the design of authentication scheme in WSNs, especially
for the sensor nodes in WSNs. It is known that the broadcast authentication technology for WSNs is mainly
divided into symmetric key cryptography (SKC) and public key cryptography (PKC).
The TESLA is a widely used identity authentication protocol in the Internet. It is based on SKC and
can enhance the speed of broadcast authentication and the intensity of computation. However, due to the
limited energy and limited communication bandwidth, the TESLA scheme cannot be directly applied to the
1
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WSNs. So a lightweight TESLA scheme, namely µTESLA [Perrig et al., 2002], is proposed for broadcast
authentication in the WSNs. The asymmetry of µTESLA is produced by the delayed transmission of
symmetric keys, which can be used to produce effective broadcast authentication. Subsequently, other
broadcast authentication schemes based on µTESLA have been proposed [Drissi & Gu, 2006; Liu & Ning,
2004; Liu et al., 2005]. Although these SKC-based authentication methods have many advantages, such as
less consumption of resources and communication, the possibility of attack is not taken into account, which
will lead to the delay of the release of asymmetric keys and the failure of network transmission. Because
broadcast authentication is a one-way authentication, so asymmetric cryptosystem is more suitable for
broadcast authentication than the symmetric cryptography. The RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) are widely used for PKC, and the PKC can be applied to WSNs after the improvement and
optimization. For instance, Ren et al. [Ren et al., 2007] and Du et al. [Du et al., 2008] have proposed the
PKC-based broadcast authentication for WSNs by using ECC. Besides, the public key of nodes can be
easily calculated according to the identity information of wireless sensor nodes. Therefore, it can eliminate
the need of the public-key certificates. The approaches of the authentication and key-exchange protocols
which is based on Chebyshev chaotic map has been proposed in [Dariush & Morteza, 2018; Jiang et al.,
2016; Hsu & Lin, 2013]. Compared with the ECC-based and RSA-based schemes, the results of the above
method showed that the Chebyshev chaotic map-based schemes are more suitable for devices due to the
limited battery life and small computation power, because the signature computation requires smaller key
size, and the semi-group property of Chebyshev chaotic map provides faster computation speed [Chatterjee
et al., 2018].
Chaotic systems have some inherent cryptographic characteristics, such as pseudo randomness and
sensitivity to initial conditions which means that any tiny change or perturbation can cause the current
trajectory a greatly different behavior [Wang et al., 2016; Deng et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2015a, 2016;
Attaullah & Shah, 2015; Li et al., 2019], which is crucial and applicable for the chaos-based cryptosystems
[Liu et al., 2015b; Azzaz et al., 2013; Hua et al., 2018a; Li et al., 2018a] and secure communications [Fontes
& Eisencraft, 2016]. Specifically, the one-dimensional Logistic map is used in cryptography for the first
time in [Matthews, 1989], which laid a foundation for the application of chaotic system in cryptography.
Then, an improved method for the chaotic system in [Matthews, 1989] is presented, and it is applied
in chaos-based cryptosystems [Habutsu et al., 1991]. After that, a chaos-based image encryption is first
introduced in [Fridrich, 1998]. Since then, with the development of chaotic cryptography, many chaos-based
encryption methods have been proposed. In order to obtain more complex chaotic systems, researchers have
begun to explore the chaotic map from low-dimensional to high-dimensional. Among them,the Chebyshev
chaotic map has the semi-group property which make it is suitable for the design of digital signature based
on public key cryptography. Specifically, a secure biometric-based authentication scheme using Chebyshev
chaotic map for multi-server environment has been proposed in [Chatterjee et al., 2018], which is mainly
about mutual authentication between users and servers. The authentication process is used of symmetric
encryption and the semi-group characteristic of the Chebyshev map. Considering the above discussion,
an identity-based signature scheme by using the Extended Chaotic Maps (ECM-IBS) to authenticate
all broadcast messages is proposed in this work. Different from the method in [Chatterjee et al., 2018],
the aim of this work is to design a digital signature to realise broadcast authentication by using the
multiple properties of the Chebyshev map. Specifically, a chaos-based hash function is constructed and
applied in the whole ECM-IBS, and the corresponding test is executed and analysed. The simulation
analysis demonstrates the proposed ECM-IBS scheme has a high security and efficiency, and the hardware
implementation (in CC2530 of the WSN hardware platforms ) illustrates it has a good practical feasibility
because of requiring less storage cost, computation and communication overhead. Both of them indicate
that the ECM-IBS scheme is suitable for the WSN application.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 gives the preliminaries work of Chebyshev
polynomials. In Section 3, a chaos-based broadcast authentication scheme named ECM-IBS is presented.
In Section 4, the ECM-IBS scheme is implemented, and the security performance and availability of the
ECM-IBS are analyzed. Section 5 gives the conclusion.
February 23, 2019 10:36 output
ECM-IBS: A Chebyshev map-based Broadcast Authentication for Wireless Sensor Networks 3
2. Preliminary
2.1. The first-kind Chebyshev polynomials Tn
Due to some good properties, the first-kind Chebyshev polynomials was found to be used for the
application of the public-key cryptosystems [Kocarev & Tasev, 2003], key agreement protocols [Qin et al.,
2010; Yan et al., 2015; Bergamo et al., 2005] and the authentication schemes [Bergamo et al., 2005].
Definition 1: The n-dimensional Chebyshev polynomial is given by
Tn(x) = cos(nθ) when x = cos(θ), (1)
where x ∈ [−1, 1], and the parameter θ ∈ [0, π].
Definition 2: Let n be an integer, the first-kind Chebyshev polynomial Tn(x) : [−1, 1]→ [−1, 1] can
be defined by
Tn(x) = 2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x), n > 2, (2)
where the initial conditions are T0(x) = 1, and T1(x) = x, and the common expression of the first-kind






4 − 8x2 + 1,
T5(x) = 16x
5 − 20x3 + 5x.
(3)
Definition 3: Semi-group property of the Chebyshev polynomials can be described by
Tr(Ts(x)) = cos(r · cos−1(cos(s · cos−1(x))))




where r and s are two positive integers, and x ∈ [−1, 1]. Kocarev et al. [Kocarev & Tasev, 2003] extended
the definition of the Chebyshev polynomial from the real domain to the finite field. For instance, in the
finite field of x ∈ ZP (P is prime), the Chebyshev polynomial can be defined by
Tn(x) = (2xTn−1(x)− Tn−2(x)) mod P, n ≥ 2. (5)
As for the extended Chebyshev polynomial, Tr(Ts(x)) ≡ Trs(x) ≡ Tsr(x) ≡ Ts(Tr(x)) mod P is still
established.
Definition 4: The discrete logarithm problem (DLP): if the parameters x, y are given and they are
satisfied by Tr(x) = y, it is difficult to calculate the integer r.
Definition 5: The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP): if the parameters x, Tr(x) and Ts(x) are all given,
it is difficult to calculate the integer Trs(x).
It is generally believed that the security of extended Chebyshev maps relies on the difficulties of the
above computational problems which are not solvable in polynomial time.
2.2. Counteracting dynamical degradation and discretization of digital chaotic
system
Theoretically, chaotic system or chaotic map have ideal complex dynamics. However, because of the
finite precision of simulation software and digital devices during implementations, chaotic systems often
undergo dynamical degradation, which hinders the further application of digital chaotic systems in many
fields. Therefore, several methods have been proposed to address this problem [Li et al., 2018b; Hua et al.,
2018b, 2019; Liu et al., 2017].
In [Liu et al., 2017], a new method has been introduced to counteract the dynamical degradation of the
digital chaos. Specifically, the continuous Chen system is used to perturb both the inputs and parameters of
the Chebyshev map to minimise the chaotic degradation phenomenon under the finite precision. Similarly,
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Chen system is firstly discretized by using Euler algorithm for the digital implementation to get the digital
system. For example, the digital Chen system is described byxi+1 = (1− a · T ) · xi + a · T · yi,yi+1 = T · (c− a) · xi + (1 + T · c) · yi − T · xi · zi,
zi+1 = T · xi · yi + (1− T · b) · zi,
(6)
where a = 35, b = 3, c = 28 and the sampling interval is defined as 2ms (i.e. T = 0.02). Moreover, the
outputs xi, yi of the digital Chen system are used to disturb the input and parameter n of the Chebyshev
map. Thus the improved digital chaotic system can be described by
x̄i+1 = cos(F (x̄i, yi) arccos(H(x̄i, xi))), (7)
where the perturbing functions H and F are designed by{
H(x̄i, xi) = mod(x̄i + xi, 1)× 2− 1,
F (x̄i, yi) = mod(x̄i + yi, 1) + 6.
(8)
Owing to the limited accuracy, limited operation, limited memory and low power of the WSN notes,
it becomes difficult to directly implement the floating-point arithmetic, division and other complicated
computing. Then the above system is firstly optimized to make it suitable for the implementation of the
WSN nodes, that is, both sides of the equation (6) are multiplied by g2 to getxi+1 · g
2 = (1− a · T ) · xi · g2 + a · T · yi · g2,
yi+1 · g2 = T · (c− a) · xi · g2 + (1 + T · c) · yi · g2 − T · xi · zi · g2,
zi+1 · g2 = T · xi · yi · g2 + (1− T · b) · zi · g2.
(9)
In order to further optimize Eq. (9), assume
ẍi = xi/80 · g,
ẍi+1 = xi+1/80 · g,
ÿi = yi/80 · g,
ÿi+1 = yi+1/80 · g,
z̈i = zi/80 · g,
z̈i+1 = zi+1/80 · g.
(10)
Combining Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), the renewed digital Chen system can be expressed by
ẍi+1 = (1− a · T ) · ẍi + a · T · ÿi,
ÿi+1 = T · (c− a) · ẍi + (1 + T · c) · ÿi − 80Tg · ẍi · z̈i,
z̈i+1 =
80T
g · ẍi · ÿi + (1− T · b) · z̈i.
(11)
In order to remove the floating-point operation, Eq. (11) can be further optimized by ẍi+1 = (930 · ẍi + 70 · ÿi)/1000,ÿi+1 = (14 · ẍi + 1056 · ÿi − 49 · ẍi · z̈i/10000)/1000,
z̈i+1 = (49 · ẍi · ÿi/10000 + 994 · z̈i)/1000.
(12)
Since the range of xi, yi, zi of Chen system is in [−80, 80], then the range of ẍi, ÿi, z̈i will be in [−g, g],
where g = 2S (S denotes the computer word size). Similarly, it is also difficult to calculate cos and arccos
operations of the Chebyshev map for WSN nodes, then according to the specific introduction of Chebyshev
polynomials as shown in Section 2.1, the Eq. (2) can be supposed to quantify by
Tn(x) = T̄n(x)/a− 1,
Tn−1(x) = T̄n−1(x)/a− 1,
Tn−2(x) = T̄n−2(x)/a− 1,
x = x̄/a− 1.
(13)




− 2)T̄n−1(x)− T̄n−2(X)− 2x̄+ 4a, (14)
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x̄3 − 12a x̄
2 + 9x̄.
(15)
Then, because the range of Tn(x) is in [−1, 1], so the range of T̄n(x) will be in [0, 2a]. For example, when
the word size of the processor is S, i.e., a = 2S−1, T̄n(x) ∈ 2S can be established which would just represent
the unsigned integer with computer word size. Therefore, there will exist the shifting, multiplication,
subtraction, complement, addition and other basic operations for the calculation process of T̄n(x), which
would be suitable for the WSN nodes.
As mentioned above, the outputs ẍi, ÿi of the digital Chen system are used to disturb the parameter
n and the input of the improved Chebyshev map, respectively. Specifically, the parameter n is obtained by
checking the range of ẍi, which allows the Chebyshev map have different forms. Thus, the chaotic system
can achieve a better performance even if under a low finite precision. The parameter n and the final output
can be expressed by
n =
3, if ẍi ∈ (0, 5000]4, if ẍi ∈ (−5000, 0]





xi+1 = Tn(xi + (abs(ÿi))
2), (17)
where the final output is xi, and i is the number of iterations. Therefore, the digital chaotic system can
have a better performance and faster calculation speed under lower finite precision if it is implemented in
the above disturbance and discretization method.
3. Chaos-based broadcast authentication scheme
This section presents a new broadcast authentication and it includes a broadcast authentication scheme
that based on the Chebyshev chaotic system and a chaos-based one-way hash function. Specifically, Section
3.1 introduces the overall frame of the broadcast authentication in WSNs. As an important component
of the broadcast authentication, one-way hash function can protect information and reduce the length of
data in the transmission process. Specifically, the pre-operation of the plain-text is required by conventional
hash function, and the length of plain-text after pre-processing will be greater than or equal to 512 bits. Of
course, it is not necessary to do this relatively high complexity pre-processing if the communication data
is small, and this case is most common in the WSNs. In addition, the WSNs do not require long digest of
information, e.g., the digest length of SHA-1 is 128 bits. Based on the above consideration, a novel hash
function for the WSNs is designed in Section 3.2, which is based on the improved chaotic system.
Table 1. The notations used in this paper.
Notation Description
SKBS The master secret key
PKBS The public key
M Message
IDi The identities of users
h(·) A secure one-way hash function
Ts Current system time stamps
Si Signature
‖ The message concatenation operation
DIDi The private key
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3.1. Design of the broadcast authentication scheme
In order to better introduce the scheme, some notations which could be used for the broadcast au-
thentication are firstly indicated in Table 1. Besides, the proposed broadcast authentication phase can be
divided into five parts which is shown in Fig. 1.
Sender Base station Receiver





𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖)). 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵, 
𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃 (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ,𝑁𝑁). 




δ = ℎ�𝑚𝑚�|𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠|�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖�, 
Send {𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑚𝑚,𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 , 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖} 
δ′ = ℎ�𝑚𝑚�|𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠|�𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖�, 
𝑣𝑣 = ℎ(𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖) 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖) = 𝑇𝑇𝛿𝛿′ (𝑣𝑣) 











Fig. 1. Broadcast authentication phase.
System Initialization: as a private key generator, the base station is safe and trusted by default,
and it is in charge of the initialization of the system. Specifically, randomly select two different large prime
numbers P and Q which must have similar bits and compute N = P ·Q and L = (P 2 − 1)(Q2 − 1). Then
select the base stations secret key SKBS (0 < SKBS < N), and compute the corresponding public key
PKBS to satisfy the qualification of SKBS · PKBS ≡ 1 (mod L), where the master secret key SKBS is
stored in the base station and the system parameter SP (PKBS , N) is public.
Key generation: All sensor nodes that in the WSNs should have their own private key. As for the
sensor node i, its private key DIDi = TSKBS (h(IDi)), where the SKBS is the master secret key, h(·) is a
secure hash function, and the IDi is the identity information of the sensor node. And each sensor node i
must stores the information of {IDi, DIDi , SP}.
Message broadcast: When any one sensor node i senses an event that is required to quickly report,
the node i firstly must computes the message digest through δ = h(m ‖ Ts ‖ IDi), where Ts is the current
time stamp, and then computes the signature through Si = Tδ(DIDi)(mod N). In this method, only the
nodes which own the private key from the base station can sign a message. Therefore, the final broadcast
message must contain the message m, time stamp Ts, identity of the sensor node IDi and the signature
Si, i.e., the final broadcast message is consistence of {Si,m, Ts, IDi}.
Authentication: When the node receives the broadcast messages, it will firstly check the time stamp
Ts. If the Ts is correct, it indicates that the message is fresh and the node will perform signature verification
on the fresh message; otherwise, the message will be discarded. This can be a good defence against replay
attacks. Specifically, the process of signature verification Si for the receiver can be detailed as follows. For
example, the digest of the node can be computed by
δ
′
= h(m ‖ Ts ‖ IDi), (18)
and
v = h(IDi). (19)
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When the equation of TPKBS (Si) = v is established, the receiver will accept this message; otherwise it
will be discarded. Specifically, TPKBS (Si) can be calculated by
TPKBS (Si) = TPKBS (Tδ(DIDi))
= TPKBS (Tδ(TSKBS (h(IDi))))





As described above, any tiny change of the broadcast message will result in the failure of signature
verification in the transmission process, and it guarantees the integrity of the message. In contrast, the
signature information from the sensor node will not be verified if the sensor node does not own the private
key from the base station. Therefore, every sensor node can verify the received broadcast messages through
this method, and it can simultaneously speed up the dissemination of information on the premise of ensuring
the security of information sources.
Sender revocation: when it is necessary to undo a stolen sensor node i, other nodes in the network
obtain the IDi through the broadcast of the base station, and these sensor nodes store this IDi. In the
later period, if anyone sensor node receives the message which contains this IDi, this sensor node only need
to reject this message instead of the authentication process. Specially, the situation that only a few sensor
nodes in WSNs can be compromised by the adversary is assumed. Because if the greater part of the sensor
nodes been intercepted by the opponents, the whole system will be in danger. Therefore, in addition to
malicious nodes, other legitimate sensor nodes in the entire sensor network can periodically update system
parameters and keys via the base station. However, this kind of update will lead to a high cost for the
entire system. Therefore, the sensor node that is attacked or damaged is removed from the entire network.
In theory, this is an effective solution.
3.2. One-way hash function for WSN
 𝑛𝑛 = �
3,    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ?̈?𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ (0, 5000]
4,    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ?̈?𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ (−5000,0]
5,    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ?̈?𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ [,−5000] ∪ [5000, ]
, (19) 
and 
 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖+1 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + (𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐(?̈?𝑦𝑖𝑖))2). (20) 
where the final output is 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, and 𝑖𝑖 is the number of iterations. 
  Therefore, the improved map can be used as the mold of the compression function 𝑖𝑖. 
3.3 One-way hash function for WSN 
  Considering a hash function is given by  
 𝐻𝐻 = 𝐻𝐻(𝑀𝑀) (21) 
where  𝑀𝑀 is a variable length message, 𝐻𝐻() is a nonlinear function, and the H is a hash value with a fixed 
length. 
  As discussed above, the proposed chaotic system is suitable for the WSN nodes, so it will be used to 
design the hash function which is shown in Fig. 2. Specifically, a message of arbitrary is firstly divided into 
several blocks, and the l ngth of each block is a character due to the short message length of the WSNs. 
Then, each block is synchronously processed through a secure hash function to get respective output, and 
these outputs are mixed to calculate the final hash value. The detailed process is as follows. 
Message
f f ff f
b[1] b[2] b[i] b[p-1] b[p]
... ...
Mixing operation
key key key keykey
H
  
Fig. 2. The whole structure of hash function. 
10 
 
Fig. 2. The whole structure of hash function.
It is well known that even though The chaotic systems degrade slowly under high finite precision,
it will be degraded dramatically if they are implemented on devices with low finite precision, such as
sensor nodes. These dynamical degradation, i.e., short period phenomenon and strong correlations etc.,
can directly affect the application in chaos-based cryptography. Therefore, a novel method to improve
chaotic degradation is proposed in this paper, and it can guarantee there still be a better performance for
the digital implementation under low precision. Besides, in order to reduce the computational overhead,
the chaotic system can be performed with integer operations which is described in Section 2.2. As discussed
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before, the proposed chaotic system is suitable for the WSN nodes, and it can be used to design one-way
hash function as well. Then a hash function is given by
H = H(M), (21)
where M is a variable length message, H() is a nonlinear function, and the H is a hash value with a fixed
length. The whole design structure of the proposed one-way hash function is shown in Fig. 2. Specifically,
a message with the arbitrary length is firstly divided into several blocks, and the length of each block is set
as a character due to the short message length of the WSNs. Then each block is synchronously processed
through a secure hash function to get corresponding outputs. These outputs are finally used to calculate
the final hash value. The detailed process is given as follows.
Step 1: Transform each character in the message into the corresponding ASCII code b[i] which is used
as the input of each secure hash function f . And b[i] is converted into three values as the three inputs of
the Chen system by  ẍi = b[i] + i,ÿi = b[i] + 2i,
z̈i = b[i] + 3i.
(22)
Moreover, the above proposed system is chosen as the mathematical model of hash function.
Step 2: Execute the compression operations by
H1i = f(key, ẍi, ÿi, z̈i, 13), (23)
H2i = f(key, ẍi, ÿi, z̈i, 16), (24)
H3i = f(key, ẍi, ÿi, z̈i, 19), (25)
or
H4i = f(key, ẍi, ÿi, z̈i, 22), (26)
where the function f has been designed in Section 2.2, key is the previous state value of the improved
Chebyshev map in Eq. (17), and ẍi, ÿi, z̈i are three inputs of the Chen system shown in Eq. (12). And the
number of 13, 16, 19 and 22 are the iteration numbers of improved Chen map and Chebyshev map.
Step 3: Then execute the following operations by
H1 = H
1
1 ⊕H12 ⊕H13 · · · ⊕H1i , (27)
H2 = H
2
1 ⊕H22 ⊕H23 · · · ⊕H2i , (28)
H3 = H
3




1 ⊕H42 ⊕H43 · · · ⊕H4i . (30)
Step 4: Get H = dec2bin(H1)[1 : 32] ‖ dec2bin(H2)[1 : 32] ‖ dec2bin(H3)[1 : 32] ‖ dec2bin(H4)[1 : 32]
as the final 128 bits hash value H. The function dec2bin(x) can convert a decimal number into a binary
number represented by string. And the length of the binary number can be controlled to suit different
requirements.
4. Implementation and performance analysis
In this paper, the protocols are implemented in Z-stack operating system. The hardware nodes are
used of the self-made ZigBee network communication platform, and its main chip is CC2530 (8-bit, 8051
Micro-controller unit, 32 MHz, voltage 3V). Considered of the limited hardware resources, limited power
supply capacity, and limited communication bandwidth of WSNs, the degree of the security is usually not
needed very strict to some extent. In [Perrig et al., 2002], they only use a 64-bit signature size. Therefore,in
this paper the signature size is chosen as 160-bits. The collision resistant hash adopts 64-bits truncation of
chaos-based hash function that is designed in Section 3.2.
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4.1. Security analysis
The security of the proposed ECM-IBS scheme is firstly discussed from the aspects of authentication,
verification, integrity and freshness: 1) Authentication. As described above, if the sensor node doesnt
own the private key from the base station, the signature information from this sensor node will not be
verified in this work, i.e. the authentication is achieved only when the legitimate broadcast senders can
sign a message. 2) Verification. Every sensor node can verify a broadcast message from other senders. 3)
Integrity. In the transmission process, any tiny change of the broadcast message will result in the failure of
signature verification, which can guarantee the integrity of the message. 4) Freshness. Replayed data can
be distinguished by checking the time-stamps, i.e. freshness of data can be provided.
Besides, the proposed method can also counteracts some common security threats. The analysis is
presented as follows: 1) Active attack. The proposed method uses secure digital signature schemes to
provide strong authentication and message integrity. This makes it impossible for an intruder to modify a
valid message sent by another legitimate sender. In the meantime, the time stamp Ts can prevent duplication
of a broadcast message. 2) DoS attack. The proposed broadcast scheme provides authentication without
delay. Hence, it prevents DoS attack which is faced in µTESLA. 3) Node compromise attack. In symmetric
key schemes, if a single key or a subset of keys are used by more than one sensor nodes to calculate
a message authentication code, the compromise of a single node enables an intruder to impersonate all
sensor nodes sharing that message authentication code key(s). However, in this scheme, an intruder can
only impersonate the compromised node. Furthermore, for revocation process this node will be not able
to broadcast more messages in the network. 4) False data injection attack. The proposed method enables
all sensor nodes in the communication path to verify and filter out false injected data during multi-hop
forwarding, thus the false data injection attack is counteracted.
4.2. Characteristic analysis of compound chaotic sequence
(1) Correlation analysis. The auto-correlation function describes the degree of dependence between







where L is the sequence length, and j is the relevant interval. The auto-correlation of the original Chebyshev
map is shown in Fig. 3(a) when a = 215.
4. Implementation and performance analysis 
  In this paper, the protocols were implemented in Z-stack operating system. The hardware nodes use the 
self-made ZigBee network communication platform, and its main chip is CC2530 (8-bit, 8051 MPU, 32 
MHz, volta e 3V).  
  Because of the limited hardware resources, limited power supply capacity, limited communication 
bandwidth of WSNs, the security requirements are usually not needed very strict. I  Ref [4], they only use a 
64-bit signature size. So in this paper the signature size is chosen as 160-bits. The collision resistant hash 
adopts 64-bits truncation of chaos-based hash function that designed in Section 3.3. 
4.1 Characteristic analysis of compound chaotic sequence 
4.1.1 Correlation analysis 
  The autocorrelation function describes the degree of dependence between two state values of any one 




∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖+𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1  (27) 



































Fig. 3. Autocorrelation function of two comparative systems. (a) Discretized Chebyshev map. (b) 
Discretized compound system. 
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As shown in Fig. 3(a), it can be seen that the auto-correlation of the Chebyshev sequence is bad.
Ideally, the auto-correlation function of any random series should be a delta function. Fig. 3(b) is the
auto-correlation of the improved digital system, which shows that the correlation characteristics of the
compound chaotic system are good.
(2) NIST test. The NIST test suite is an industry standard of random test through 15 tests, and
it is used to verify the performance of the designed binary sequence. NIST test is for binary sequence, so
the first step is to transfer the integer sequence into binary sequence, that is, each of these integers can be
converted into a 16-bit binary data. Specifically, these 15 tests focus on evaluating the same sequence with
n bits to obtain a p-value. For the specific experiment, the binary sequence is with a length of 107 bits.
The significance level α is set at 0.01, which is commonly used in the NIST test. The result demonstrates
that the binary sequence can pass the statistical test if p-value ≥ α; otherwise, it fails. Table 2 summarises
the experimental result and it illustrates the produced binary sequence can pass all the standard, which
means the binary sequence is randomness to some extent.
Table 2. Uniformity of the P -value under each test in the NIST
suite (compound chaotic system)
Statistical tests p-value Conclusion
Frequency test 0.495025 pass
Block Frequency test (m=128) 0.677011 pass
Cusum test mode 1 (forward) 0.583273 pass
Cusum test mode 2 (reverse) 0.527143 pass
Rank test 0.514326 pass
Long runs of ones test 0.296117 pass
Runs test 0.535826 pass
FFT test 0.650647 pass
Non-overlapping Templates test 0.991656 pass
Overlapping Template test (m=9) 0.156512 pass
Universal test 0.354654 pass
Approximate entropy (m=10) 0.592749 pass
Random Excursions (x=+1) 0.518265 pass
Random Excursions Variant (x=-1) 0.457353 pass
Linear Complexity (M=500) 0.341668 pass
Serial (m=16) 0.649842 pass
4.3. The security and performance analysis for hash function
In this section, the final hash value is chosen as 128-bit in order to better compare the performance of
this work with that of other schemes from the aspects of distribution, sensitivity, statistical performance,
and collision resistance analysis.
(1) Distribution analysis. For a hash function, the uniformity of the generated hash value is an
important criterion for evaluating its security. In this test, the initial plain-text message is: “In general, the
identity authentication is based on three parameters: what you know (password based), what you possess
(smart cards), and what you are (biometrics). And for WSNs, the authentication is mostly based upon the
first situation (what you know). Besides, the password-based scheme must be closely related to the secret
keys and any other cryptographic material that is usually used by identities to prove their uniqueness.
Fig. 4 is the test result, in which Fig. 4(a) is the distribution of the ASCII code values of the original
plain-text, and Fig. 4(b) shows the distribution of the corresponding hexadecimal hash values. It can be
seen that the original plain-text is concentrated in 100 ∼ 120, and the distribution of the hash values is
relatively uniform. Besides, in order to exclude the special circumstances, the distributions of the full “0”
plain-text and its corresponding hash value are experimented and tested, and the result is shown in Fig. 5.
These simulation results demonstrate that the proposed hash scheme has a good performance on confusion
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and diffusion.
  In this section, the final hash value is chosen as 128-bit in order to better compare the performance of this 
work with that of other schemes. 
4.2.1. Distribution analysis 
  For a hash function, the uniformity of the generated hash value is an important criterion for evaluating its 
security. In this test, the initial plaintext message is: “In general, the identity authentication is based on three 
parameters: what you know (password based), what you possess (smart cards), and what you are 
(biometrics). And for WSNs, the authentication is mostly based upon the first situation (what you know). 
Besides, the password-based scheme must be closely related to the secret keys and any other cryptographic 
material which is usually used by identities to prove their uniqueness.” 
Fig. 4(a) is the distribution of the ASCII code values of the original plaintext; Fig. 4(b) shows the 
distribution of the corresponding hexadecimal hash values. It can be seen that the original plaintext is 
concentrated in 100 ~ 120, and the distribution of the hash values is relatively uniform. Fig. 5 shows the 
distribution of full “0” plaintext and corresponding hash values, respectively. The simulation results show 
that the proposed hash scheme has a good performance on confusion and diffusion. 





































Fig. 4. Distribution: (a) the initial message and (b) the corresponding hash value. 
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Fig. 5. Distribution: (a) of full ‘0’ message and (b) the corresponding hash value. 
4.2.2 Sensitivity of hash value to message 
  Initial sensitivity is another important criterion to evaluate the security of the hash function. A good hash 
function should satisfy that any slight change in the initial plaintext will cause the generated hash value has 
a dramatically change. In this experiment, the original message is set as ASlKJK4654, and then changes the 
original message. Table 3 illustrates the sensitivity analysis of the message. 
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis of hash function to message. 
No M Hash values 
C1 ASlKJK4654 8BECE71139E2867B77C050C239E2867B 










  Fig. 6 is the corresponding binary distribution of hash values in Table 3. The results show that the small 
change in the plaintext will lead to an unpredictable change for hash value. Therefore, the proposed hash 
scheme has a strong sensitivity to initial value. 
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Fig. 5. Distribution: (a) of full “0” message and (b) the corresponding hash value.
(2) Sensitivity of hash value to message. Initial sensitivity is another important criterion to
evaluate the security of the hash function. A good hash function should satisfy that any slight change
of the plain-text will cause the generated hash value has a huge change. In this experiment, the original
message is set as ASlKJK4654, and t en it is changed with one bit to get different hash values. Table 3
illustrates the results of the sensitivity analysis of the message. Moreover, Fig. 6 is the corresponding binary
distribution of hash values in Table 3. The results show that a tiny change of the plain-text will lead to an
unpredictable change of hash value. Therefore, it can be seen that the proposed hash scheme has a strong
sensitivity to plain-text.
(3) Statistical analysis. The security performance of the hash function is determined by the plain-
text and its hash value. It is generally known that the hash value is supposed to be 0 or 1 in binary format,
then the ideal diffusion effect is that in the same condition any subtle change in the original message will
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cause 50% probability of change for each bit in the hash value [Qin et al., 2010]. The experimental method
is to firstly select a plain-text and get its hash value, then randomly switch one bit of the original plain-text
and obtain a new hash value. Compare these two hash values and set Bi as the number of the changed
bits. Fig. 7 shows the distribution of the number of bits (about 64 bits) and the probability of change after
2048 tests (about 50%).
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis of hash function to message.







Fig. 6. Binary distribution of different hash values in Table 3. 
4.3.3. Statistical analysis 
  The security performance of the hash function is determined by the plaintext and its hash value. It is 
generally known that the hash value is supposed to be 0 or 1 in binary format, then the ideal diffusion effect 
is that in the same condition any subtle change in the original message will cause 50% probability of change 
for each bit in the hash value [20]. The experimental method is to firstly select a plaintext and get its hash 
value, then randomly switch one bit of the original plaintext and obtain a new hash value. Compare these 
two hash values and set 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 as the changed bits. Fig. 7 shows the distribution of the number of bits and the 
probability of change after 2048 tests. 
































Fig. 7. Distribution of changed bit number and probability. 
In addition, four statistical parameters are used to test the statistical performance which are mean 
changed bit number (𝐵𝐵�), mean changed probability (P), standard deviation of the changed bit number (∆𝐵𝐵) 






























Fig. 6. Binary distribution of different hash values in Table 3.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Distribution of changed bit number and probability.
In addition, four statistical parameters are used to test the statistical performance which are mean
changed bit number (B̄), mean changed probability (P ), standard deviation of the changed bit number
(∆B) and standard deviation of the changed probability (∆P ). Assuming N is the experimental times, the
mean changed bit number (B̄) can be calculated by B̄ = 1N
∑Bi
i=1Bi. The mean changed probability (P )
is calculated by P = B̄128 × 100%. The standard deviation of the changed bit number (∆B) is calculated
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128 − P )2 × 100%.
If N is 256, 512, 1024 or 2048, the corresponding test results are shown in Table 4. It can be seen from
the statistics that the average change number of bits B̄ is 63.9207, and the average change probability P
is 49.94%, which are all closer to the theoretical value of 64 bits and 50%. In addition, the values of ∆B
and ∆P are very small, which shows this hash function has good diffusion and confusion ability. Statistical
simulation results show that the ability of the expected scheme can be ensured to mitigate any type of
linearly related hash differential attack.
Table 4. Hash value statistics with one bit change of plain-
text.
N=256 N=512 N=1024 N=2048 Mean
B̄ 63.9297 63.7656 63.9658 64.0215 63.9207
P 5.9629 6.0716 5.9001 5.7572 5.9230
∆B 49.95 49.82 49.97 50.02 49.94
∆P 4.66 4.74 4.61 4.50 4.63
(4) Analysis of collision resistance. For a hash function, if the situation that different initial plain-
text yields the same hash value happens, it will be called the collision. In this section, two methods are
used to test the anti-collision capability of the proposed hash scheme [Liu et al., 2015a].
 𝑚𝑚 = ∑ |𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖′|𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  (32) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖′ are the i-th ASCII character of the original and the new Hash value, respectively. 
  The above process is repeated 2048 times, and the results of collision statistics and absolute distance are 
shown in Fig. 8 and Table 5, respectively. Fig. 8 shows the proposed scheme only 137 tests hit 1 times and 
other tests hit 0 times. Therefore, the hash function that proposed in this paper has a strong anti-collision 
ability. 
 
Fig. 8. The results of the hit number. 
Table 5. Absolute distance between two hash values. 
Absolute distance 𝒅𝒅 Maximal Minimal Mean 
Our algorithm 2531 809 1544.7 





























  The second test method is that the plaintext message and the corresponding hash value is firstly set to be 
one byte, and the range of the corresponding ASCII code is 0 ~ 255, this will allows plaintext space to be 


















Fig. 8. The results of the hit number.
The first method is to firstly select an initial plain-text, and then randomly changing 1 bit of the
initial plain-text to get a new plain-text. Through the hash function, two corresponding hash values are
generated and stored in ASCII code form. Co pare two hash values and count their number of identical
ASCII codes at the same position, i.e., the number of collisions. Then the absolute distance is calculated







where mi and m
′
i are the i-th ASCII character of the original and the new Hash value, respectively.
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Table 5. Absolute distance between two hash values.
Absolute distance d Maximal Minimal Mean
Our algorithm 2531 809 1544.7
Luo et al. [Luo & Du, 2012] 2418 796 1598.6
Ref. [Li & Sun, 2008] 2524 872 1675.0
Ref. [Yang & Gao, 2008] 2343 256 1314.0
Ref. [Xiao et al., 2009] 1952 605 1227.8
Ref. [Ren et al., 2009] 2455 599 1439.0
Ref. [Huang, 2011] 1882 650 1251.2
Ref. [Li et al., 2011] 2220 687 1432.1
Ref. [Wang et al., 2011] 2064 655 1367.0
The above process is repeated 2048 times, and the results of collision statistics and absolute distance
are shown in Fig. 8 and Table 5, respectively. Fig. 8 shows the proposed scheme only 137 tests hit 1 times
and other tests hit 0 times. Table 5 shows that the absolute distances between hash values in [Luo & Du,
2012] and [Li & Sun, 2008] are larger than the proposed method. This is because the proposed method
abandons plain-text pre-processing operations and complex operations in the scrambling process in order
to achieve a faster computation speed. However, the proposed method still has sufficient absolute distance,
i.e. the collision probability of the algorithm is small.
equal to hash value space. The number of any value in the hash value space mapping into the plaintext space 
is k, and n (k) denotes the number of k ASCII values in the hash value space. If n (1) is greater, n (0) and 
others are smaller which m ans the hash function algorithm has better confusion and diffusion performance, 
and its collision probability will be smaller. Therefore, the value of n (1) can be used as the index to measure 
the anti-collision performance, and the anti-collision performance of the algorithm can be calculated by 
 𝑅𝑅(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘)∑𝑛𝑛(𝑘𝑘) (33) 
  From Fig. 9, it can be seen t at the proposed algorithm has good collision resistance performance. 























Fig. 9. Distribution of the n(k)-k and the R(k)-k. 
4.3 Overhead analysis 
  The proposed broadcast authentication algorithm is further analyzed from the perspective of the 
computation overhead, communication overhead and storage overhead. 
4.3.1 Computation overhead 
  𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛, 𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 and 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ represent the execution time that  getting a signature, verifying a signature 
and computing a hash value, respectively. For ease of comparison, the computation overhead of the 
proposed scheme is measured by the average execution time at which the sender and receiver authenticate a 
broadcast message. Fig. 10 summarizes the average time of 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛, 𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑣𝑦𝑦 and 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ for the broadcast 
message with the size of 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100, respectively. The experimental data illustrates the 
19 
 
Fig. 9. Distribution of the n(k)-k and the R(k)-k.
The second test method is that the plaintext message and the corresponding hash value is firstly set to
be one byte, and the range of the corresponding ASCII code is 0 ∼ 255, this will allows plaintext space to
be equal to hash value space. The number of any value in the hash value space mapping into the plaintext
space is k, and n(k) denotes the number of k ASCII valu s in the hash value space. If n(1) is greater,
n(0) and others are smaller which means the hash function algorithm has better confusion and diffusion
performance, and its collision probability will be smaller. Therefore, the value of n(1) can be used as the






From Fig. 9, it can be seen that the proposed algorithm has good collision resistance performance.
February 23, 2019 10:36 output
ECM-IBS: A Chebyshev map-based Broadcast Authentication for Wireless Sensor Networks 15
4.4. Overhead analysis
The proposed broadcast authentication algorithm is further analysed from the perspective of the
computation overhead, communication overhead and storage overhead.
(1) Computation overhead. Tsign, Tverify and Thash represent the execution time that getting a
signature, verifying a signature and computing a hash value, respectively. For ease of comparison, the
computation overhead of the proposed scheme is measured by the average execution time at which the
sender and receiver authenticate a broadcast message. Fig. 10 summarises the average time of Tsign, Tverify
and Thash for the broadcast message with the size of 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100, respectively. The experimental
data illustrates the computation overhead is acceptable for the broadcast authentication in WSN nodes.computation overhead is acceptable for the broadcast authentication in WSN nodes. 
 
Fig. 10. Execution time of getting a signature, verifying a signature and computing a hash value. 
4.3.2 Communication overhead 
  As for ECM-IBS scheme, the final message broadcasted by one node usually includes the message m, 
time stamp 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, identity of the sensor node 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 and the signature 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖, i.e., {𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚,𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, 𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖}, thus the total 
length of a transmitted message should be 
 Sensor to Sensor: |𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖| + |𝑚𝑚| + |𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠| + |𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖| = 160 + 80 + 16 + 64 = 320.  (34) 
  However, as for the ECM-IDS scheme in Ref. [32], the signature is 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎 + 𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎2 = 160 + 160 +
160 = 480, so the total length of a transmitted message is 
 Sensor to Sensor: |𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖| + |𝑚𝑚| + |𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠| + |𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖| = 480 + 80 + 16 + 64 = 640. (35) 
  Therefore, the proposed ECM-IBS scheme is more suitable for WSNs with limited resources owing to a 
less communication overhead. 
4.3.3 Storage overhead 
  The storage space required for the master key is 1, and the network capacity is N. In the ZigBee original 
specification, the cost of storing the master key is (N-1) in the key distribution scheme. In addition, for the 
SKKE protocol, the relevant parameters for the establishment of the link key need to be saved. In this paper, 



























Fig. 10. Execution time of getting a signature, verifying a signature and computing a hash value.
(2) Communication overhead. As for ECM-IBS scheme, the final message broadcasted by one node
usually includes the message m, time stamp Ts, identity of the sensor node IDi and the signature Si, i.e.,
{Si,m, Ts, IDi}, thus the total length of a transmitted message should be
| Si | + | m | + | Ts | + | IDi |= 160 + 80 + 16 + 64 = 320. (34)
However, as for the ECM-IDS scheme in [Islam, 2014], the signature is Si = Sa + Sa1 + Sa2 = 160 +
160 + 160 = 480, so the total length of a transmitted message is
| Si | + | m | + | Ts | + | IDi |= 480 + 80 + 16 + 64 = 640. (35)
Therefore, the proposed ECM-IBS scheme is more suitable for WSNs with limited resources owing to
a less communication overhead.
(3) Storage overhead. The storage space required for the master key is 1, and the network capacity
is N . In the ZigBee original specification, the cost of storing the master key is (N−1) in the key distribution
scheme. In addition, for the SKKE protocol, the relevant parameters for the establishment of the link key
need to be saved. In this paper, the master key pre-allocation process in the ZigBee original specification
is avoided. Therefore, it is not required to preset the master key and store the common parameters of
the ZigBee network, and the public and private key information of the nodes. Fig. 11 gives the storage
overheads of the proposed ECM-IBS and ZigBee original specification. It can be seen that when the network
capacity is not large, both the original ZigBee specification and the ECM-IBS scheme can maintain a small
storage overhead. However with the increase of network capacity, the storage coast of the original ZigBee
specification gradually increases, due to the stored redundancy of the master key. In this paper, because
the authentication and key distribution process is based on identity, it does not increase the storage cost
when the network capacity increases, and this maintains the scalability of the network.
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and private key information of the nodes. Fig. 11 gives the storage overheads of the proposed ECM-IBS and 
ZigBee original specification. 
  It can be seen that when the network capacity is not large, both the original ZigBee specification and the 
ECM-IBS scheme can maintain a small storage overhead. However with the increase of network capacity, 
the storage coast of the original ZigBee specification gradually increases, due to the stored redundancy of 
the master key. In this paper, because the authentication and key distribution process is based on identity, it 
does not increase the storage cost when the network capacity increases, and this maintains the scalability of 
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Fig. 11. Storage overheads of the ZigBee original specification and the proposed ECM-IBS scheme. 
5. Conclusion 
  In this work, a novel authentication scheme namely ECM-IBS has been proposed, and it employs one 
signature to authenticate all broadcast messages. The simulation analysis demonstrates that the proposed 
ECM-IBS scheme has a high security and efficiency, and the hardware implementation (in WSN hardware 
platforms CC2530) illustrates that it has a good practical feasibility due to the low storage cost, computation 
and communication overheads. Therefore, the proposed ECM-IBS scheme is suitable for the WSN 
applications. 























Fig. 11. Storage overheads of the ZigBee original specification and the proposed ECM-IBS scheme.
5. Conclusion
In this work, a novel authentication scheme namely ECM-IBS has been proposed, and it employs one
signature to authenticate all broadcast messages. The simulation analysis demonstrates that the proposed
ECM-IBS scheme has a high security and efficiency, and the hardware implementation (in WSN hardware
platforms CC2530) illustrates that it has a good practical feasibility due to the low storage cost, compu-
tation and communication overheads. Therefore, the proposed ECM-IBS scheme is suitable for the WSN
applications.
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